Introduction
In departments of economics in the United States today the academic field of economic history is far more economics than history. Freshly minted economic historians with PhDs in economics write dissertations that are collections of essays with a principal "job market paper" just like other fields of economics, rather than books-in-waiting as in history. Many of the freshly-minted will have earned their stripes in economics departments where there is a research group composed of multiple economic historians and, perhaps, fellow travelers; dedicated research seminars; and routine doctoral production -again, similar to other fields of economics.
1 Faculty mentors in these departments counsel their PhD students to structure the thesis research -for example, which topics to choose, which techniques to use, and so onwith the aim of developing the skills necessary to produce articles on a regular basis for refereed economics journals --ideally the most prestigious general interest outlets such as the
American Economic Review (AER), Journal of Political Economy (JPE), or the Quarterly Journal of
Economics (QJE) . A budding economic historian will "introduce" herself to the profession by presenting a paper at a specialist meeting -the annual convention of the Economic History Association (EHA) or the Cliometrics Conference -but also at general economics meetings, such as those held by the Allied Social Science Association. Once the degree is on the horizon, the economic historian will seek employment as an economist -for example, a tenure track position as an assistant professor of economics --for which there is an active and efficient market (Abramitzky 2015) .
Compared with just a few decades ago scholarly identity in economic history today falls on a continuum. There are well-known economic historians who are visible in other fields of economics along with economists who earn fame and fortune in these other fields but who conduct research in economic history from time to time. 2 Economic historians are appointed to prestigious offices or committees in the American Economic Association (AEA), serve on the editorial boards of mainstream and field journals in economics, are nominated for and sometimes win major economics prizes, and provide economics expertise as public servants.
These and other related features of professional economic history in the contemporary United
States mentioned in this and the previous paragraph are markers of a stylized fact that I call the "integration of economic history into economics".
I am far from the first scholar to document the integration of economic history into economics. There are various ways to do so (see, for example, Whaples 1991 Whaples , 2002 , and some of what I do is very closely related to Abramitzky (2015) . 3 I shall offer two types of evidence.
The first derives from text processing of digitized journal articles using Google Scholar (GS). I use GS to search through past issues of the Journal of Economic History (JEH) and the AER for instances of econometric language -for example, the words "logit" or "probit". I compare these instances with measures of the "population at risk" -basically, articles and 2 "Visible" means publishing in economics journals, whether or not the topic is historical. I present evidence this has become quite common among scholars receiving their PhDs after the year 2000. Examples of economic historians who received their PhDs after 2000 and who routinely publish in economics journals are Ran Abramitzky (public economics), Martha Bailey (labor/demographic economics), Leah Boustan (urban economics), Carola Frydman (corporate finance), and Nathan Nunn (trade). Examples of prominent economists today who do not consider themselves to be economic historians primarily but who write in economic history from time to time are Daron Acemoglu, Robert Gordon, Lawrence Katz, Matthew Kahn, Daniele Paserman, Thomas Piketty, Claudia Olivetti, Valerie Ramey, and James Robinson. 3 In particular, Abramitzky (2015) also uses GS to show that the percentage of economic history articles appearing in "top-five" economics journals (e.g. AER) increased after 2000, which is consistent with the findings of my Table  1. notes/comments published in regular and conference proceedings of both journals. Trends in usage suggest that economic historians adopted econometric methods at more or less the same rate as the economics profession at large by mid-to-late 1980s. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Nobel Laureate, econometrician, and occasional economic historian James Heckman (1997, p. 404) The second type of data are the early publication histories by PhD cohort of economic historians with doctorates in economics. By "early" I mean the first ten years post-PhD, and by "publication history" I mean the classification of published research into various categories - it is much less than perfect --hence, sample #2 is a bit more representative of the economic history profession than sample #1.
I find a long-run increase in the fraction of articles published in economics journals, including the "top-five" (e.g. AER) economics journals. Total journal productivity is roughly constant across cohorts, so the increase in economics publishing is offset by a decrease in publishing in economic history and other outlets, along with a decrease in the probability of publishing a monograph. Further analysis shows that, while these trends are present in the 1980s and 1990s PhD cohorts (relative to the 1970s), there is a structural break for those obtaining their doctorates after 2000.
To explain the integration of economic history into economics, I offer a simple analytic framework. The components of the framework are initial conditions, labor market structure/incentives, and selection.
The initial conditions are those in effect at the dawn of cliometrics. Then, as now, economic historians in the United States sit either departments of history or economics, not in departments of economic history. In the aftermath of World War Two the discipline of economics was growing rapidly and there was an emerging demand within economics for evidence on the historical development of rich countries like the United States, both to serve as grist for policy advice to developing countries and as "stylized facts" for growth theory. I see the cliometrics revolution as a supply-side response, one that could only come from scholars trained in economics departments. Since then, the demand in economics for economic history has waxed and waned for various reasons but it has always been present in one form or another.
The second component is labor market structure and incentives. By "labor market structure" I am referring to the "overlapping generations" nature of academic labor markets.
Senior scholars train junior scholars, and also evaluate junior scholars for tenure and promotion. The incentives are those associated with labor market success -tenure, promotion, fame; and, on occasion, fortune. Junior scholars value success and therefore pay close attention to whatever the incentives happen to be in the discipline in which they are employed when allocating their time, talents, and resources. While I do not model the process explicitly, I assume that the standard used in evaluating junior scholars is an equilibrium outcome of interactions between senior faculty inside and outside the field, reflecting their
respective beliefs about what is meritorious, and their relative bargaining power. After a shock to the system a new equilibrium might emerge quickly, or the transition might be protracted. Although the framework can broadly explain the trend in integration of economic history into economics, the structural break in publication histories for post-2000 PhDs is surprising. There were two "transformative" impulses that broadly characterize the first generation of cliometricians. Some wished to use economic tools to transform history, making it more theoretically "rigorous" and quantitatively grounded. Others wish to use history to transform economics, on the belief that economics was ignoring crucial factors in economic growth and development. The first impulse is commonly associated with Robert Fogel, and the second with Douglass North. I shall try to persuade readers that the effects were to slow the pace at which economic history integrated into economics. Both impulses remained strong through the 1980s and 1990s but waned after 2000, and thus may explain the structural break in publication histories, at least in part.
The integration of economic history into economics has brought tangible benefits to economic historians with PhDs in economics -an active job market, with the relatively high salaries and good working conditions that come with an economics doctorate. Can the economics profession expect this to continue for the foreseeable future? Taking a cue from Romer (1994) I suggest that one possible conclusion of current trends is that economic history might disappear as a separate field in economics. Instead, historical topics for which economists profess an enduring demand would become part and parcel of each field, but other topics not so privileged would disappear from economics scholarship and the economics curriculum, as would generalist courses in economic history taught in economics departments.
This can be a negative externality if said topics are covered elsewhere in the academy but minus the economics. I argue that the emergence of a new "history of capitalism" in academic history is a case in point. In a nutshell, there are costs to integration as well as benefits. As a professional discipline the origins of economic history can be dated to those of academic economics and academic history in the late nineteenth century (Lamoreaux 2016 These developments aside, a snap-shot of the economic history profession at midcentury gives the distinct impression of an intellectual backwater. The topics in play were largely those that had occupied the profession for the preceding half-century. The JEH, which had been established in 1941 along with the EHA, was entering its second decade of publication. Regular issues appeared three times a year, with a fourth devoted to the "The Tasks of Economic History" consisting of papers given at the annual EHA meeting and summaries of their discussion. A typical issue had three main articles; a similar number of shorter notes, comments, or review articles; and book reviews -roughly 100 pages in length, including front and back matter. Digesting the contents while taking the train from, say, New
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Haven to Manhattan would have been easy -not so today.
Nonetheless, change was in the air. The economics profession began to grow rapidly after World War Two. Some of this growth can be attributed to rising demand for college teaching of economics, fueled by the GI Bill, and also to an expanded role for economists in Of singular importance for economic history was the emergence of a specific intellectual demand from economics for historical evidence on growth. This demand had three fundamental sources. The first was the National Bureau of Economic Research, previously mentioned. Led by Simon Kuznets, a research group at the NBER was deeply immersed in developing the infrastructure for extending the measurement of national accounts back in time.
The second source was the Cold War, which created a pressing need in the West to provide policy advice to developing nations lest they fall into the Soviet orbit. The third source was growth theory which originated before the War but which received a large intellectual boost with the publication of Solow's (1956 Solow's ( , 1957 fundamental papers. While doctoral programs in economics at the time often included some coursework in economic history the courses were very traditional with little connection to the advances in theory and statistics occurring elsewhere in the discipline.
The time was ripe, therefore, for a revolution to take place, in which the tools of economics were put to use to provide a body of evidence and rigorous argument that would supply the growing demand for economic history in economics. As I shall argue later, because this demand had its origins in economics, it could only be supplied from within. This was the cliometrics revolution.
Usage of Econometric Language
I track instances of the use of econometric terminology, comparing the JEH -one of the flagship journals in the field -with the AER --one of the leading general interest journals. My analysis provides a way of measuring when articles in economic history began to "look like" those in economics in terms of econometric practice. By focusing on econometrics I am using an "end of period" definition because, as is well-known, there is a strong upward trend in that economics has become more empirical over time, with an ever increasing share of articles in which econometrics is present.
I search for instances of econometric language using computerized text processing of digitized files of both journals using Google Scholar (GS) as the search engine. The "advanced"
features of GS allow me to search for a specific word or phrase in a specific journal during a specific period of time. GS will then return a list of "items" in which the word or phrase appeared. Items are returned only once, even if the word appears multiple times in an item.
An item consists of any self-contained file that has been digitized. In the case of an academic journal, this could be an article, or note, or it could be a book review, a report by the journal editor, and so on. By imposing certain screens and also scanning the list of results, I can eliminate items (for example, advertisements) that are irrelevant to the analysis. I search for four econometric words or phrases: "regression", "logit", "probit", and "maximum likelihood".
Obviously, this does not cover the gamut of possibilities but through trial and error I determined that looking for additional words or phrases -for example "t-statistic" or "R 2 " or "instrumental variables" did not change my substantive findings.
Although GS can find instances of the use of particular words or phrases, it is not well suited to computing the "population at risk" -that is, the types of items where it is reasonable to imagine that one might find the term present and used appropriately in context. For example, I am interested in occurrences of the use of econometric language in scholarly articles because in such articles the language is being put to a substantive purpose, whereas I am not interested in the use of such language in, say, a book review. 6 I determine the population at risk by manual inspection -that is, examining each issue of the journal over the relevant time period and (literally) counting. For the JEH the population at risk is the number of articles, notes, and comments that appear in regular issues or the so-called "Tasks" issue. 7 For the AER, the population at risk consists of article, notes, and comments appearing in a regular issue or in the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.
6 A book review might refer to the use of econometrics in the monograph but it is extremely rare for a reviewer to run a regression and report the results as a substantive part of the review. 7 The JEH ceased publication of the "Tasks" issue in 1997, substituting instead a regular issue in June but retaining the presidential address and summaries of doctoral dissertations and associated commentary delivered at the preceding annual meeting.
Once I have the counts for the numerator -items containing an econometric word or phrase -and the denominator -the population at risk, I compute the ratio. At present my empirical analysis covers the period 1948 to 2010. The results are displayed in Figures 1-3 . Figure 1 shows the proportion of items in which the word "regression" appears. Early in the 1950s there is evidence of a strong upward trend emerging in the AER which leads to a large gap with the JEH that persists into the 1960s. The AER trend subsequently flattens out and even declines for a while, before resuming upward movement in the 1990s. It is not until the early 1970s when use of the word "regression" starts to become more frequent in the JEH.
By the early 1980s the proportion of articles mentioning "regression" is quite similar in levels in both journals, and the trends basically track each other afterwards.
One might object to Figure 1 on the grounds that, in principle, the JEH could have filled every issue after a certain point with econometric history. However, as long as economic theory is a separate sub-field in economics some portion of articles in the AER will have formal models but no econometrics. For this reason, therefore, Figure 1 may understate the true difference.
One way to get around this is to consider econometric techniques that were more esoteric than regression or truly novel at some point but which, ex-post, have turned out to be broadly useful. The idea is to see if such techniques appear in the JEH more or less simultaneously as in the AER, or with a lag. The shorter the lag, the more integrated is economic history into economics.
Along these lines Figures 2 and 3 , respectively, show the proportion of articles in which the phrase "maximum likelihood" (Figure 2 ) or "logit" or "probit" (Figure 3 ) appear. In the case of maximum likelihood, there is some evidence that such articles were more common in the AER than in the JEH after advances in computing made maximum likelihood more feasible computationally by the 1980s. That said, the phrase does appear in articles in the JEH in the 1970s and then more routinely by the 1990s. The words "logit" and "probit" appear with greater frequency earlier in the AER than in the JEH, but by the 1980s there are steep upward trends in both the JEH and AER that more or less track each other closely.
To summarize, the evidence in Figures 1-3 For the population at risk I select two samples. The first, as previously noted, is a sample of "prominent" economic historians, where prominence refers to having been a president of the EHA, a JEH (or EEH) editor, or having been awarded tenure at "top-10" economics departments or the business school equivalent. In its present form, the sample #1 is numerically balanced by having six scholars in each PhD cohort-decade.
The second sample consists of conveners of the dissertation session at the annual meetings of the EHA. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the EHA has regularly sponsored a session at the annual meeting at which new PhDs make brief presentations of their thesis research. Two prizes are awarded, one for the "best' dissertation in American economic history and similarly, one for the best dissertation on a non-American topic (for example, the British Industrial Revolution). Typically, three dissertations are chosen in each category for presentation at the meetings, so six in all. There are two conveners, one for each category, and each of whom selects the winner ("best") in the relevant category. In almost all cases the conveners publish comments on the dissertations presented at the meetings in the Journal of Economic History and thus the conveners can be identified.
The conveners are selected by the EHA president. There are no explicit selection criterion that must be followed. In fact, however, even a minimal glance at the list of conveners makes it obvious that the choices are made with care. Tastes differ -some presidents favor their own students, while others might showcase someone whom they or a significant fraction of the field regard as "up-and-coming". Because of the latter effect, the list of conveners overlaps somewhat with sample #1.
In the present draft, data on publication histories are taken from on-line CVs, typically those posted at department or personal websites. These are very convenient to use and (presumably) accurate. The downside side is that, when individuals retire (or die), the on-line CV usually disappears from the web. 8 This is not an issue for sample #1 but it is somewhat for sample #2 for the dissertation sessions of the 1960s and early 1970s. For sessions held from the mid-1970s to the present, I am able to find on-line CVs for conveners. Table 1 shows sample means, grouped by PhD decade, for sample #1 (Panel A) and sample #2 (Panel B). The columns show the fraction publishing at least one monograph; the average number of monographs conditional on publishing at least one; the total number of refereed articles; the proportion of articles published in economics journal; the percent of total articles published in "top-five" economics journals; the percent of articles published in economic history journals; and the percent published in "other" journals.
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The general patterns are fairly clear. Taking sample #1 first, total journal productivity is roughly constant across PhD cohorts, but there is a long-term downward trend in the proportion publishing at least one monograph in the first decade post-PhD. There are also downward trends in the proportion of total articles published in economic history and in "other" journals, and corresponding increases in the proportion published in economics journals, including top-five. The trends are modest, however, for the pre-2000 cohorts -that is, there is a structural break for scholars obtaining the PhD after the turn of the century.
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Measured by the total number of journal articles sample #2 is somewhat less productive than sample #1, particularly among scholars who obtained their PhDs in the 1990s. Otherwise, the trends in publication histories are broadly similar across the two samples, as is the occurrence of a structural break post-2000.
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Sample sizes are too small for a detailed regression analysis, but one might wonder if the patterns are affected by differences across PhD granting institutions. Accordingly I estimated regressions for which the dependent variables are the same as in the column titles in Table 1 In other words, the structural break is robust to the introduction of the AEJ jounrals. 11 There is some censoring bias in the post-2000 cohorts, because not everyone has experienced a decade of career post-PhD. The bias is minimal in sample #1 (only one scholar, Richard Hornbeck, is affected) but slightly larger in sample #2. I suspect but obviously cannot yet demonstrate that the structural break will likely be larger once enough time passes for the censoring bias to disappear.
I sketch a simple analytical framework to explain the integration of economic history into economics. The framework has several moving parts -initial conditions; labor market structure; and selection. The theory part of the framework pertains to labor market structure, so I start with this.
Labor Market Structure
There is an "overlapping generations" structure to the academic labor market. On the supply side, there are individuals -scholars --who engage in scholarship and teaching; on the demand side, there are university departments that hire scholars. Departments and "disciplines" are equivalent, so there are departments of economics, of history, and so on.
Departments (disciplines) are divided into fields -for example, labor economics is a field in Economics, "Early Modern Europe" a field in History. "Economic history" can be a field either in economics or history (or both) but is not itself a discipline (see below).
Scholars live for three periods. In period #1, a person enters a disciplinary PhD program and devotes all of her time to human capital investment, eventually obtaining a PhD that qualifies her for employment in a disciplinary university department. In period #2, she is hired as an assistant professor and devotes all of her time to research.
At the end of period #2, our assistant professor faces an "up or out" vote of the period #3 faculty at her institution. If a majority vote in favor she advances to period #3 facultysenior status or "tenure"; if it is negative, she takes an outside option. Upon receiving tenure, she spends part of her time training PhD students (period #1 scholars) and part of her time evaluating assistant professors (period #2 scholars) for advancement.
Each senior faculty member in department j has one vote in an "up or out" tenure decision. In deciding which way to vote the senior faculty member personally evaluates the research of the tenure candidate and also takes into account the opinions of the other senior faculty in the department and also external senior faculty in the same field as the candidate.
These external scholars do not vote per se but offer their opinions as to whether the vote should be up or out. Thus, the outcome of the tenure decision depends on a weighted average of the opinions of internal senior faculty in the same field as the tenure candidate (if any), the external faculty in the same field whose opinions are solicited, and the opinions of internal senior faculty in other fields.
In evaluating a tenure case, I assume that senior faculty, whether internal or external, apply reference standards that are specific to the discipline, field, and their PhD cohort.
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These standards refer to content -for example, the use of econometrics -and form -journal articles versus books. Because the tenure decision is a disciplinary one, and all of the voting senior faculty have PhDs in the relevant discipline, it is reasonable to hypothesize that, in equilibrium, the disciplinary component of the standards will be prominent and, to a first approximation, broadly similar across fields within a discipline. Thus, for example, candidates in fields in economics would be expected to offer a research portfolio consisting mainly of journal articles, for such has long been the disciplinary norm in economics. Whereas, in 12 See Poelmanns and Rousseau (2016) for evidence that disciplinary standards strongly affect the format and publication outlets chosen by junior scholars in economic history; and Diamond (1980) for evidence from the late 1970s that year of PhD influenced an economic historian's "acceptance" of cliometrics in the direction (negative, meaning older is less accepting) implied by my framework. Implicit in my argument is that the gatekeeping function of period #3 faculty has value, both to the gatekeepers and to those being evaluated. Alternatively, we can imagine a hierarchy beyond the department that values academic prestige and has sanctions in place that guard against a breakdown of tenure standards.
history, a tenure candidate would be expected to offer one (or more) books, because books are the scholarly norm.
Crucially, by making the standards depend on PhD cohort of period #3 faculty I am introducing a lag structure in faculty opinion that potentially will feed back on the behavior of period #2 faculty and, consequently, tenure outcomes. To keep the time line squarely in mind, at date T = N, period #2 scholars up for tenure received their PhDs in N -1 and are evaluated by period #3 scholars who received their PhDs in period N -2.
Initial Conditions, Sorting, and the Cliometrics Revolution I posit several initial conditions before running a thought experiment. The first initial condition is that there are departments of economics and departments of history, but no departments of economic history. Instead, "economic history" is a subject that exists in both economics and history departments; however, an economic historian hired in economics still has to have a PhD in economics (and vice versa). Initially, the labor market for economic historians is in equilibrium such that the standards for promotion have a common component, regardless of whether the scholar is employed in history or in economics. As a concrete example, we could suppose that an economic historian in an economics department can present a book for tenure in lieu of some number of articles in economics journals that would otherwise be expected of candidates in economics.
13 13 To consider another pertinent alternative, senior economic historians might convince their senior colleagues in other fields that junior economic historians will promote the discipline of economics by publishing in history outlets, and this is good overall for the discipline.
Second, I assume that, PhD training in economics requires investment in certain types of technical skills -for example, mathematics and statistics -which in the initial equilibrium have no special use or value for historians or for economic historians, whether the latter are employed in history or in economics departments. If individuals were identical ex ante, there would be a compensating differential for economic historians employed in economics department; instead, I shall assume that individuals differ in their ability or comparative advantage in the aforementioned technical skills. Those with a comparative advantage at learning technical skills "sort" into PhD economics programs.
Third, a shock occurs at date T = K that creates a new demand for the use of technical skills in economic history in economics departments. We can think of this shock as derived from research undertaken by period #3 faculty in economics departments when they were themselves junior scholars but who are not themselves economic historians -for example, in order to test a new theory of economic growth a long time-series of GNP is necessary which, presently, does not exist but requires technical skills to construct.
To run the model, note that the shock creates an incentive for period #2 economic historians at date T=K to supply what is demanded, but this cannot come from economic historians employed in history departments because of the sorting assumption. The supply will necessarily come from period #2 economic historians employed in economics departments.
However, period #2 economic historians in economics departments will soon be evaluated for tenure. They are evaluated by period #3 economists and economic historians who received their PhDs in period K -2 -that is, before the shock. The senior economists like what the "new" economic historians are doing because it uses technical skills to respond affirmatively to the demand instigated by the senior economists in K-1. Senior economic historians, however, place no special value on the use of technical skills because the skills previously were not used by them. To successfully advance period #2 economic historians in time period K must figure out how to "package" their research to appeal to two masters -both the senior economic historians and economists who are evaluating their work. The successful ones advance to tenure status, and help train period #1 scholars and evaluate period #2 scholars at t = K + 1.
At time K+ 1 the period #2 scholars will now have to gain the support of period #3 economic historians as well as other senior economists. Period #3 economic historians will expect more technical work in the tenure portfolios they evaluate, because it was expected of them, but they will also expect that the work will appeal to historians because that, too, was expected of them. As the model continues to run, the content and form of the research portfolios of economic historians who are successful getting tenure in economics departments will become closer in content and form to other fields in economics.
To summarize thus far, the basic prediction of the model is that, as long as economic historians continue to be in demand in economics departments, there will be convergence in the tenure portfolios of period #2 faculty and economic historians employed in economics will increasingly "look like" other economists. This occurs because of the nature of the incentives for advancement and the "overlapping generations" structure of the labor market. The speed of convergence can be fairly quick, but ultimately depends on the precise nature of the standards employed in evaluating faculty and the relative weight given to the different "interest groups" among period #3 faculty. If, for example, disciplinary standards are strongly favored in the voting, convergence can be very rapid.
As noted above, one of my initial conditions is that economics has a technical component to the skill set, which induces sorting. If the technical component increases over time, differences in the skill sets between economic historians in economics and history departments will widen across cohorts. As a result, the content, and possibly the form, will diverge, perhaps to the point where there will be little or no overlap, even though the field has the same nominal title in both disciplines.
Discussion and Speculation
The evidence presented in Figures 1-3 and Table 1 appears broadly consistent with my model. After the cliometrics revolution articles in economic history became similar to economics in the use of econometrics (Figures 1-3) . Successive PhD generations of economic historians who were employed in economics departments shifted their early publication portfolios towards economics publication outlets and away from economic history outlets and book publishing. But the evidence also suggests that the integration was somewhat slow in getting started. In particular, the gap in econometric use widens in the 1960s before narrowing in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, although some shift towards publishing in economics outlets is present by PhD cohorts of the 1980s, but the difference between the 1970s cohorts and those of the 1980s -and even the 1990s --is not that large, whereas the differences are far greater for the post-2000 PhD cohorts -that is, there is a structural break in the publication histories.
I believe the initial difference in econometric use between economics and economic history can be explained partly by the model and also by considerations not included in the model, namely, the costs of performing econometric analyses.
The framework reminds us that the first generation of cliometricians had to appeal to more traditional economic historians as well as economists who were intrigued by the prospects of a more "economic" economic history. In addition to the computerized text processing displayed in Figures 1-3 I have read through all of the articles in the Journal of Economic History in the 1960s in which the word "regression" is used in the econometrics sense. This is less work than might be imagined, because there are only 16 such articles, or roughly 1 in every 20. In six of the ten years, there was only one article using regression.
The infrequent use of econometrics as cliometrics was "taking off" has been noticed previous (see, for example McCloskey 1987). The conventional point of view is that, above all, cliometricians was about applying economic reasoning to historical issues, and econometrics was icing on the cake. There is something to this argument, but I believe it misses two crucial points, neither of which is captured explicitly in my model. The first is that econometrics was still expensive to conduct in the 1960s. Mainframe time was costly and data entry and programming was time consuming. While some economists and economic historians had skills in computer science, these were not widespread, unlike today. 14 Even if the training had been more widespread and costs lower -as would be true by the late 1970s and early 1980s -there were few historical data sets then available. By contrast, economics already began to benefit from the availability of household surveys, such as the micro-data sample of the 1960 census, the first to be released for public use.
My model is also helpful here because, as discussed earlier, after the initial demand shock calls forth a "new" economic history, the economic historians who are supplying the new have to convince their elders on the economic history side to be supportive. Some were enthusiastic; others, not so much. One senses this immediately in reading through the 1960s JEH articles in which regression is used. It is not simply that they are infrequent; it is also that the manner in which econometric results are presented and discussed is different from the norm just a decade or two later. Results are not presented in tabular form, as later became common. Typically, instead, they are briefly discussed in the text and the relevant details reported in a footnote. Econometrics is never the main event and it is rarely organic, in the sense that one cannot imagine the same points being made another way. Authors go out of their way to downplay the novelty.
Of course, the early cliometricians were also appealing to their other master, economics, at the same time, and using a little of econometrics, even buried in footnotes, went a long way. And the early cliometricians could certainly telegraph what they were about without running regressions. One of the initial conditions in my framework is that there was a demand for economic history in economics that emerged after World War Two. This demand 84 percent of the papers that he published in the first decade post-PhD appeared either in economic history or "other" journals.
was new, in that economists like Simon Kuznets, Walt Rostow, and others sought a firmer quantitative foundation for the study of long-run economic growth. This foundation was meant to provide empirical guidance both for growth models and for policy advice to developing countries.
The founders of cliometrics clearly were reacting to this demand. The Nobel Committee lauded Robert Fogel for his calculation of the social savings of the railroad, but the chapter of Fogel (1964) for the time, a policy option being offered to less-developed countries.
Accounting for the Structural Break in Publication Histories
The initial lag in econometric use can be plausibly explained by costs of doing econometrics and, in any case, the lag disappeared fairly quickly. The structural break in publication histories is more surprising because the framework suggests more or less steady convergence through a succession of PhD cohorts.
One possible explanation of the structural break is that it reflects the waning influence of the first generation of cliometricians. I have argued that cliometrics was a supply-side response to a specific demand from economics. However, once the first generation of cliometricians took a careful look at the existing economic history literature, it proved to be an irresistible target. The intellectual holes were wide and deep, the academic equivalent of shooting fish in a barrel. 15 The task of "reinterpreting" (e.g. The impulse in early cliometrics towards reforming history is commonly associated with one Nobelist in the field, Robert Fogel. Another impulse was to use history to reform economics. This impulse is associated with Douglass North, the other Nobelist in economic history. North began his career as a conventional cliometrician but by the late 1960s and early 1970s, shifted gears towards the issues -institutions and institutional change -for which he is honored today. For North, economic theory and econometrics were powerful tools but the models favored at the time -for example, the Solow growth model -were seriously flawed because they omitted or downplayed factors that North felt were first order. North also chided cliometricians for not doing enough to change economics and for becoming too cozy with the status quo as economic history integrated with economics.
15 As Fogel reminisced about the early years of his graduate teaching, "I challenged [PhD] students to pick any page at random from whatever history book they had at hand. The odds were … that there'd be either an explicit or implicit quantitative statement that needed to be measured. The challenge was often taken up and I was never shown up [.] " Quotation from Williamson and Lyons (2013, p. 350) .
I believe that the impulses that cliometrics should reform both history and economics slowed the integration of economic history into economics. With the benefit of hindsight it is far from obvious that the goal of subjecting as much as possible of the pre-existing literature of economic history to cliometrics scrutiny was worth the scholarly effort allocated to it. Like every discipline, academic history is full of arcane debates that fail to hold the attention of scholars in other fields. After the initial novelty wore off, economics decided it had limited interest in who won which historical debate and why, and that the formats and outlets favored -monographs and "interdisciplinary" journals -had less prestige value than economics journals. History, too, began to part with cliometrics by the mid-to-late 1970s, in part because of the rancorous debate over Fogel and Engerman (1974) but also simply because economics was becoming ever more technical. Demand for one of the scholarly activities favored by the early cliometricians began to dry up.
The impulse that economic history should "reform" economics may have had a similar effect. It is not often that disciplinary criticism is successful. A critic may have a worthy target, but not necessarily the means to fix the problem. In the end North was right, because economics eventually did buy into the idea that institutions matter. But North himself was not inclined to provide the necessary formal tools for institutional analysis and neither were his students. The requisite tools did appear once the theory of dynamic games developed to the point where it could be applied profitably to institutions and institutional change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) .
To the extent that the impulses just described caused second generation cliometricians to turn towards history and away from economics, the effects can be seen in the publication histories of the 1970s PhD cohorts in Table 1 . Book publication was universal, and the vast majority of journal articles appeared in economic history or "other" journals -roughly six of every seven -than in economics journals. The 1980s and 1990s cohorts had begun to move towards economics outlets, but the changes were relatively modest on average.
As my data on publication histories shows, integration accelerated sharply after the post-2000 PhD cohorts appeared on the scene. One simple explanation is that Fogel's and
North's influence waned because both were over age 70 by 2000. Another is that various second or third generation cliometricians became role models for integration. Claudia Goldin's early articles and first book (Goldin 1976) were squarely in the Fogelian tradition but her second book (Goldin 1990 ) and the articles associated with it addressed a far larger core audience in economics, showing how historical evidence could reshape and advance fundamental topics in labor economics as well as economic history. Christina Romer's various papers on spurious volatility in aggregate time series (e.g. Romer 1986 ) provided spectacular examples of how a large and very important field, macroeconomics, could go wildly astray by collectively forgetting the historical details underlying the sources of macroeconomic data.
Goldin was a PhD student of Robert Fogel's. Her PhD students, among those of other second and third generation cliometricians who participated in this "quiet revolution" of sorts, are some of the post-2000 PhD economic historians who, as Table 1 shows, shifted their publication sharply toward economics, accelerating the pace of integration.
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I suspect, however, that a role model explanation is not the full story behind the structural break. In the early 2000s development economics found new common cause with economic history, one not rooted in the "lessons" from the past achievements of developed countries but rather how "natural experiments" in the distant past could explain contemporary differences in per capita income (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Diamond and Robinson, 2011) . The formal theory of economic growth was revitalized with the development of so-called "endogenous growth models" which, as in the 1950s and 1960s, created a burst of enthusiasm for economic history in the growth field (e.g. Galor and Weil 2000) .
Macroeconomists discovered that dynamic general equilibrium models could be applied to problems in long-term growth, such as the shift of labor out of agriculture, the demographic transition, and rising female labor force participation (e.g. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005) . The vast majority of economists who participated in these lines of research were not trained as economic historians but their collective willingness to pursue such topics was a signal that historical evidence and argument remained important to a broad swath of economics. But that broad swath of economics was accustomed to publishing and reading articles in economics journals, not in economic history journals. This, too, was a signal, to which the post-2000 PhD generation of economic historians appears to have responded loudly and clearly.
In addition, there is the relative profitability of an economics career to be considered.
Although (much) more research needs to be done on long run trends of salaries in economics relative to other fields, it appears that when cliometrics came into being differences in salaries and other aspects of working conditions between economics and history were not large. But, by the end of the twentieth century and certainly today, starting salaries are far higher in economics, and jobs much more plentiful. In addition, today there are significant economic One can speculate about the future of economic history, assuming that integration of economic history into economics were to continue. I am not the first to engage in such an exercise; the argument I develop here is related to Romer (1994) who, in the aftermath of the awarding of Nobels to Fogel and North, provocatively queried whether there might be an "end" to economic history.
Raising the question is, in effect, pointing out the endogeneity of "fields" in an academic discipline. Fields exist for good economic reasons because they are focal points for scholars seeking fellow travelers with associated infrastructure -journals, conferences -where division of labor can occur and intellectual agglomeration economies realized. However, fields are not set in stone. Economic history may be a case in point.
In my framework, economic history is demanded in economics because historical evidence is valued in economics. The model does not specify why but in the real world, not all historical evidence is created equal. As McCloskey (1976) famously quipped, the past does have useful economics, but not everything that economic historians do is useful as economics.
Moreover, the useful bits are not necessarily supplied by individuals who self-identify as economic historians.
One end game has economic history disappearing as a separate field in economics but historical content is still part of economics. Under this scenario, historical evidence and argument relevant to fields like labor or public finance would be developed primarily by specialists within these fields. There would be no generalist keepers of the historical flame but, rather, public economists whose job it is to study and teach about the history of, say, taxation and government finance; labor economists who study and teach about the evolution of retirement; macroeconomists who look to events of the past like the Great Depression for evidence to evaluate theories about fiscal multipliers; and development economists who have extracted what they believe to the key features of early industrialization, if any, that are deemed relevant for policy advice today. The knowledge developed in each of the fields would be integrated into PhD field courses, but generalist economic history courses almost certainly pass from the economics curriculum. 17 It seems obvious that, were this to come to pass, many topics that have been part and parcel of such course would no longer be taught in economics, although specific aspects might still retain sufficient interest for instruction. 18 The same would be true of economics research.
Thinking this way calls attention to an important and, arguably, negative externality associated with the integration of economic history into economics. The loss of courses and research topics from the economics curriculum is one thing but this is not necessarily worse than having the same topics re-emerge elsewhere in the academy. A current case in point is the so-called "History of Capitalism". On paper, historians of capitalism are history PhDs who are interested in some of the same topics that have captivated cliometricians, such as the economics of slavery. However, historians of capitalism conduct their business eschewing economic methods and largely ignoring past scholarship in cliometrics, even when the latter is directly on point. Economic historians who have studied the recent literature of the history of capitalism find scholarly lapses of fact and interpretation so prolific in number and egregious in content that it is easy to be dismissive -except that books by historians of capitalism have been nominated for prestigious national awards, such as the Pulitzer Prize (Olmstead and Rhode 2016; Hilt, forthcoming) .
Like all academic fields, history is subject to whims and fashion, and the history of capitalism may be today's but not tomorrow's fancy. But it is a reminder that it is not only in economics that there is demand for economic history. History retains some such demand, as do other social sciences, as does the general public. The more integrated economic history becomes in economics, the less likely it that economists will engage productively with these other demands.
Concluding Remarks
In higher education in the United States today there are only a few academic disciplines for which it can be said that there is a robust demand for new PhDs. Economics is one of these disciplines. New PhDs in economics have opportunities not only in universities but also the private sector and in government. Not only are there more jobs, but pay and working conditions are far better than in the humanities or natural sciences, on average. At present,
PhD economists who self-identify as economic historians can have their cake, and eat it, too.
There may be a future in which economic history is no longer a separate field in economics, but it would be very surprising, indeed -and, I would argue, very unlikely ---if historical evidence was not part of the conversation of academic economics at some level.
We can have our cake and eat it too because, over the past several decades, economic history has integrated into economics. This integration was largely inevitable once the initial demand shock took place calling forth the cliometrics revolution. I say "inevitable" because the nature of the shock and the institutional environment created strong incentives for scholars doing economic history to follow the money. I say "largely" because strong incentives, by themselves, do not guarantee conforming behavior. By and large, though, the incentives worked.
I largely refrain from engaging in normative analysis -that is, whether the integration of economic history into economics is desirable on social welfare grounds. A simple revealed preference argument suffices for those economic historians who followed the path of integration. I believe the integration is desirable for economic history and economics more generally. At the end of the day, there are only two types of empirical evidence in economicsexperimental and observational. There is too little of the former to be broadly useful in all fields of economics, so we cannot avoid the use of observational data. By definition, all observational data in economics sits in a particular historical context. There may be excellent reasons to downplay or outright ignore the historical context in any particular analysis, as is the norm in much of empirical economics. But this is not necessarily the case; putting the context front and center is the essence of economic history, its fundamental contribution to economics per se.
That said, there are social costs to integration. As economic history integrates, economic historians burrow deeper into the other field(s) of economics in which their topic fits.
At some point, scholarly identity may shift to the other field -lock, stock, and barrel. Such trends are accentuated as economics becomes ever more technical, because technique has a return in economics. The "big picture" disappears from view or is taken up elsewhere, and not always for the better. Individuals benefit from integration but economic historians with PhDs in economics lose influence in the broader conversation.
As an intellectual endeavor cliometrics is almost 60 years of age and economics far older. The history of economic thought is largely intellectual history. Intellectual history has its charms but by its very nature does not have much to say about the historical evolution of the "industrial organization" of economics -its nuts and bolts, how it works. There is much about this evolution that is obscure or poorly understood. Economists have a comparative advantage in doing the economic history of economics, as I hope this paper has demonstrated. Source: see text. 
